Our ref: HSR

Head Office Circular: NP/201/24

7^th August 2024

To: The Secretary

ALL BRANCHES

REGIONAL COUNCILS

 

Dear Colleague

 

RAIB, ORR and RSSB ANNUAL HEALTH & SAFETY REPORTS

 

RSSB, ORR and RAIB have now all published their 2023/24 annual reports. RSSB and ORR reports overlap to a great extent, the RAIB report is distinct reflecting the investigatory nature of the organisation. 

 

A summary of the reports is as follows:

 

Rail Accident Investigation Branch Annual Report 2023 published 23^rd May 2024

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/raib-annual-report-2023-published-2024/annual-report-for-2023

 

RAIB uses its report to question whether the rail industry has learnt lessons from the Clapham Junction and Carmont railway accidents. 

 

Clapham Junction Accident 1988

A recommendation from the Hidden Report into the Clapham accident was for Train Protection Systems – and the legal requirement for this system was established 20 years ago.  

 

In their 2023 report RAIB refers to several speeding events, which although very different from the Clapham accident – were not protected by an engineered solution of train protection. Instead, there was complete reliance on the individual signaller or driver to react correctly. 

 

RAIB explains: “TPWS (Train Protection Warning System) fitment was a stopgap measure while the railway waited to fit automatic train protection, which would bring with it features to supervise the speed of trains”. That despite 20 years having passed, “Universal fitment of such technology is a long time away” 

 

Additionally, in relation to the Clapham accident, RAIB notes that incidents at Waterloo, Dalwhinnie and South Wingfield which saw the integrity of the signalling system being compromised by the incorrect application of the processes developed following the Clapham Junction accident. RAIB explains that those with personal knowledge of Clapham who know the importance of safety processes and to learn from this retire or move away from front line jobs and that “this has impacted on the corporate memory vital to achieving safety”. 

 

Carmont derailment 2020 

RAIB explains that two years on from the publication of their report into their 2022 Carmont report, two years on RAIB notes that although a lot of work has been undertaken and progress made with closing the recommendations, that, “the majority remain open and there is a considerable way to go”. 

 

 

ORR Annual report of health and safety on Britain’s railways 2023 to 2024

https://www.orr.gov.uk/annual-report-health-and-safety-britains-railways-2023-2024

 

Fatigue

ORR is concerned about high numbers of staff working longer hours than allowed for in Network Rail (NWR) standards – and that the company could reduce this by addressing staff retention issues and industrial relations matters. 

 

Trackworker safety 

Although there were no accidents, near-misses continue to happen. Main causes were trains mistakenly signalled into line blockages, and workers on open lines but believing themselves to be in a possession or line blockage. 

 

Asset safety/earthworks 

High rate of earthworks failures – linked to poor/extreme weather, particularly high rain fall. That there have been no derailments is a consequence of monitoring remotely and on site. 

In 2020-2021 NWR committed to completing drainage asset surveys by the end of March 2024. Three regions met this deadline, but 2 – Southern and Eastern – did not. 

NWR have implemented four of the 18 Mair recommendations. “NWR struggles to deliver enough earthworks and structures examinations”. 

Modernising Maintenance

ORR write that Modernising Maintenance (MM) “needs to be done in a way that does not overload people with too much change too quickly, nor result in fatigue. An increased focus on occupational health risk is also required”.  

 

ORR writes that they found ‘a sensible and mature approach to managing change’. But less positive they found in some places that were experiencing ‘challenges’, with high levels of backlogs and deferrals of scheduled work, staff working long hours, and fewer staff to call on. And that they will continue to monitor MM in the next year. 

 

SPADs

There has been an increase in the most serious (category A) SPADs.  ORR explains that there will not be any significant reduction in SPADs until ETCS is rolled out - as this is speed supervision system and provided mitigation against over speeding and SPADs. 

ORR writes that the industry is at the limit of human reliability in terms of reducing SPADS. There needs to be a committed, settled, industry-wide approach to future train protection and speed supervision. 

Occupational h&s performance 

There were 19 workforce safety high potential incidents in 20203/24. By far the largest single cause involved near-misses to track or trackside worker in line blockages or associated line blockage irregularities. 

 

ORR Enforcement Activity

During the year ORR issued one prohibition notice and seven improvement notices. 

Also, a number of prosecutions, the largest of which was for NWR for h&s failings that led the to derailment at Carmont in Scotland in 2020 when three people died, and six were injured. They were fined under section 3 and 33 of HASWA. 

 

RSSB annual health and safety report 2023/24

https://www.rssb.co.uk/safety-and-health/risk-and-safety-intelligence/annual-health-and-safety-report

 

RSSB annual report headlines are as follows: 

• no staff fatalities
• 3 passenger fatalities
• 274 suicides/suspected suicides
• SPADs are on an upward trend. At about the same level now as about 10 years ago. Where next before ECTS is rolled out? TPWS is ok – but it doesn’t cover all areas. SPAD increase particularly in empty coaching stock trains
• Alongside trespass workplace abuse/violence increased during Covid pandemic. This maybe societal changes during that period. Sitting on edge of platform also increased
• Number of passengers has increased since last year (80-85% compared to pre Covid, this applies to all except for MTR Elizabeth Line). Though pattern of usage has change
• Health and wellbeing, sickness rates in the rail industry is nearly twice the national rate which results in over a million list workdays every year. Musculoskeletal disorders being one of the largest health and wellbeing issues
• Low number of near misses but increase in operating incidents relating to line blockages and possessions
• Workplace abuse and work-related violence continue to be key concerns
• Increase in number of earthwork failures since end of 2022.

Fatigue

The fatigue section of the RSSB report focuses on technological means of addressing the problem – RSSB explains that it is supporting industry with trials for ‘driver attention and alertness technology’. And blaming workers – doing overtime, swapping shifts, and thereby differing actual worked hours from planned workers hours, thereby increasing possibility of workers experiencing fatigue. 

 

 

            At its meeting on 6^th August 2024, your National Executive Committee noted and adopted the following report from its Health and Safety Sub-committee:

 

            We note the report from the Lead Officer and the disconcerting trends in the three reports highlighted by the Lead Officer. 

 

To raise these matters with a wider audience, we instruct the General Secretary to:

-       write an article for RMT News based on the report

-       share the report with all RMT safety reps highlighting main points 

-       share the report with all rail branches and regional councils 

-       raise the main findings in Network Rail negotiations

 

            Branches and Regional Councils to be advised. 

 

            I am acting in line with these instructions. Please bring this circular to the attention of all relevant members.

 

Yours sincerely

 

 

 

Michael Lynch

General Secretary