16 November 2016
RMT Press Office:
RMT demands halt to Southern Rail's "chaotic and lethal" axing of guards as evidence grows of serious dangers at Platform/Train interface.
RAIL UNION RMT today wrote to the Office of Road and Rail (ORR) demanding an immediate halt to the operational programme that fundamentally changes the role of the guards on Southern Rail after growing evidence that that new model is unleashing chaos and confusion at the Platform/Train interface – chaos that the union says could have potentially lethal consequences.
GTR were originally proposing to remove any responsibility for door operation from the new OBS role and also any safety critical function, including involvement with train dispatch. The company have now issued the attached “special notice” to OBS staff and Drivers.
This notice issues new instructions
• OBS staff must check the platform to ensure that passengers with any accessibility needs are able to board the train. This procedure includes the OBS alighting onto the platform.
• OBS must take control of the train doors to assist in this process.
• That there will be “exceptional circumstances” where no OBS staff will be on the train to carry out the above.
The union has said that the notice raises a number of concerns including
• What exactly is the role of the OBS staff and who is meant be doing what on the platform train interface?
• Whether all the new OBS staff are adequately trained for this role
• As management clearly see this new procedure as critical to ensure passengers requiring assistance can safely board the train why on earth are they allowing trains to run without OBS staff in exceptional circumstances?
• Has this new procedure been approved or audited by the safety regulator?
• If there is not an OBS member of staff on the train who will assist the passenger requiring assistance? Will the passenger be left behind or will the Driver have to leave the train?
• Is this proposal compliant with the 2010 Equality Act? Has it been approved by the ORR as an amendment to GTRs Disabled Persons Protection Policy?
The unions has said the latest notice seems to have been cobbled together by a management desperate to drive through DOO at any costs and who are at six and sevens about their responsibilities under the Equality Act.
RMT is demanding:
1. An immediate halt to the operational introduction by Southern of their new operational model.
2. An urgent investigation by ORR into the serious safety and access issues that have arisen since Southern began bulldozing through their plans
3. Immediate convening of talks with the unions around the alternative proposals by RMT that would guarantee a second safety critical member of staff on the Southern services.
Mick Cash, RMT General Secretary, said:
“It is crystal clear that Southern have no workable plan for downgrading the role of their guards and are now allowing safety and access to be compromised in exactly the way that the union has warned right from the start of this dispute. Management on Southern Rail has descended into total chaos with ad-hoc notices, which totally contradict statements and assurances given by the company, pinned up on notice boards in a classic case of making it up as you go along.
“The bottom line is that the company is effectively admitting that they have got it wrong and that, in order to maintain safety and access, they need a second, safety-critical member of staff on these trains. That is the issue at the heart of the current dispute. If the company had seen sense and simply accepted that fact in the talks with the union, as we requested, we could have reached a settlement.
“This crisis-management on some of the busiest rail services in Britain cannot be allowed to drag on. The consequences of failing to get a grip are potentially lethal and the union is demanding action from the rail regulator. The plans should be halted, urgent investigations into safety and access should begin and the company should be instructed by the Government to get back round the table for proper negotiations around the RMT proposals that would guarantee a second, safety-critical member of staff on these trains.”
Ends.
NOTE TO EDITORS:
Letter to ORR
Our Ref: HSR/2/15
14th November 2016
Ian Prosser
HM Chief Inspector of Railways
ORR
One Kemble Street
London
WC2B 4AN
Dear Ian
GTR – SAFETY NOTICE – OBS/ASSISTING CONDUCTOR/DRIVER
I write to raise serious concerns over the way in which GTR are implementing Driver Only Operation which is resulting in even more chaos and confusion on Southern railway.
As you will be aware GTR were originally proposing to remove any responsibility for door operation from the new OBS role and also any safety critical function, including involvement with train dispatch.
It has now been drawn to my attention that the attached special notice has been issued to OBS staff and Drivers.
This notice says
• OBS staff must check the platform to ensure that passengers with any accessibility needs are able to board the train. This procedure includes the OBS alighting onto the platform.
• OBS must take control of the train doors to assist in this process.
• That there will be “exceptional circumstances” where no OBS staff will be on the train to carry out the above.
This raises a number of concerns namely
• What exactly is the role of the OBS staff and who is meant be doing what on the platform train interface?
• Whether all the new OBS staff are adequately trained for this role
• As management clearly see this new procedure as critical to ensure passengers requiring assistance can safely board the train why on earth are they allowing trains to run without OBS staff in exceptional circumstances?
• Has this new procedure been approved or audited by you as safety regulator?
• If there is not an OBS member of staff on the train who will assist the passenger requiring assistance? Will the passenger be left behind or will the Driver have to leave the train?
• Is this proposal compliant with the 2010 Equality Act? Has it been approved by you as the regulator responsible, as an amendment to GTRs Disabled Persons Protection Policy?
I am further informed of the following scenarios that may be faced by a second person currently working a train taking instruction from the special notice:
• OBS's who are ex-Revenue Protection Officers (almost all of the OBS's at present) have not familiarised themselves with the layout of the stations on the lines they work over. They have not been given the time in their training to do this, so they don't know which are the best doors to be at to carry out the requirements of the notice of 11th November. There may be a reluctance in taking charge of the local doors because they have not been properly trained.
• Conductors currently have to be at certain dispatch points on many routes because of curvature, structures etc thus enabling them to view the length of the train prior to closing doors. This also prevents delay. The logic is fairly transparent it enables them to see the length of the train and then close the doors
• Operationally a member of staff who takes control of the doors on a passenger service when it arrives at a station, should be trained to Safety Critical standard. If a member of staff is to be given responsibility for a set of doors then they should be trained to a Safety Critical standard so that they understand the responsibility attached to the task.
• Conductors are aware of the risks attached to having a key active at a station, this includes the obviously serious issue raised above but also less obvious risks such as a customer operating the door close button while the member of staff is on the platform. The driver then has interlock and departs with the member of staff left on the platform. This leaves an individual or group of individuals with an active panel on a passenger service and the possibility of disabled customers not being able to board or alight the service. The driver would have no knowledge of this.
• If the member of staff who assists the passenger on to the service has no route knowledge then you can have a passenger board the train in carriage 6, 7 or 8 but being unable to alight at a station that is a four coach stop/station. This could occur between for example, Hassocks and Lancing.
• Further confusion has arisen over a local instruction that says OBS handset communications must be from the ‘off-side’ so as to avoid confusion – this would be the OBS staff that “must undertake a check of the platform to ensure that customers with any accessibility needs are able to board the train”
This latest notice seems to have been cobbled together by a management desperate to drive through DOO at any costs and who are at six and sevens about their responsibilities under the Equality Act.
I would request that you urgently investigate this situation and support my demand that GTR halt their implementation of DOO.
Yours sincerely
Mick Cash
General Secretary